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A study of the impact of constitutional law on community planning is largely
an appraisal of the role of the courts in the process of planning the environment of
communities. Although litigation concerning planning laws often raises issues unrelated to constitutional law, a significant characteristic of such litigation is its tend-

ency to generate constitutional law issues. Since judicial decisions on constitutional
law questions can usually be overridden only by amendment of the basic document,
in contrast to decisions on common law and statutory issues, which may be altered
by legislation, the courts are able to exert dominating influence upon community
planning. In view of the importance of the interests at stake in determining the
kind of communities in which people reside, work, rear their children, and seek
fulfillment of the whole range of human aspirations, it is appropriate to consider
whether, and in what respects, the courts have failed to protect deserving interests
with constitutional safeguards and, on the other hand, have erected unnecessary
or unwise constitutional obstacles to effective action.
Governmental regulation of economic activity and programs for economic and
social betterment no longer are likely to face serious objections grounded in the
United States Constitution. Attempts to have the powers of Congress construed narrowly have failed,1 and the legislative powers of the states seem almost unlimited by
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
contract clause of Article I, Section io.? However, it would be a mistake to assume
that there are no important problems of constitutional law today in local planning
activities. A dominant characteristic of such activities is the alteration of traditional
concepts of real property ownership. There may be some basis for a belief that the
range of the police power of the states is narrower when property is regulated than
when freedom of enterprise is controlled. At some undefinable point, regulation of
*A.B. 1939, J.D. 194', State University of Iowa. Member of the Iowa and California bars. Professor of Law, University of Texas. Member of the Planning Commission of the City of Austin, Texas.
I Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 310 U.S. 548 (1937)'Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (952); Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. NorthThe posiwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (948).
tion of the United States Supreme Court on state legislative powers was summarized recently in the
following terms: "Our recent decisions make plain that we do not sit as a superlegislature to weigh the
wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare.
The legislative power has limits . . . But the state legislatures have Constitutional authority to experiment
with new techniques; they are entitled to their own standard of the public welfare; they may within
extremely broad limits control practices in the business-labor field, so long as specific constitutional prohibitions are not violated and so long as conflicts with valid and controlling federal laws are avoided."
Douglas, J., in Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, supra at 423.
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property shades into taking of property, which must be compensated,' though it must
be conceded that the instances in which the Court has determined that this point
was exceeded are rare, and that there have been some examples of extreme legislative encroachments upon property which have gone uncompensated The decision
in Nectow v. Cambridge, invalidating a zoning ordinance as applied, has never been
overruled or disapproved and could lead to future decisions adverse to planning.
Planning regulations may also impinge upon interests regarded by the Court as
peculiarly in need of its protection, such as the right to own and occupy land
without discrimination on account of race. Obvious discrimination is clearly invalid'
and discrimination by subterfuge will surely be also. The difficult questions of the
future may grow out of official action which is not directed toward racial discrimination, but which has discriminatory effects, such as segregation of economic
classes through zoning. Constitutional law is an even more important factor in the
state courts, which have not exhibited restraint comparable to that of the United
States Supreme Court. They continue to strike down much economic and social
legislation on the ground that it violates due process and other provisions of state
constitutions. 7
REvIEw

OF CASES IN TH UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'

A chronological review of community planning cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court might well start in i9o9 with Welch v. Swasey,s in which the
Court rejected contentions that a Massachusetts statute directing creation of two
building height districts in Boston deprived landowners of property without due
process of law and denied equal 'protection of the laws, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Mr. Justice Peckham said that in determining the reasonableness of
regulations of this type, "the matter of locality assumes an important aspect" and
that the United States Supreme Court should attach great significance to the judgment of the highest court of Massachusetts, which had upheld the statute. However,
Mr. Justice Peckham cautiously avoided a determination whether the police power
could be exercised for a "merely esthetic purpose," concluding that this measure
might have had as its aim the protection of residential areas from the risks of collapsing walls of tall buildings gutted by fire. The opinion contained no intimation that the regulation had any relation to the goals of preventing overcrowding
SPennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
What Mr. Justice Holmes said in that
opinion should be compared with the following statement made by him elsewhere: "The fact that
tangible property is also visible tends to give a rigidity to our conception of our rights in it that we do
not attach to others less concretely clothed. But the notion that the former are exempt from the legislative modification required from time to time in civilized life is contradicted not only by the doctrine
of eminent domain, under which what is taken is paid for, but by that of the police power in its proper
sense, under which property rights may be cut down, and to that extent taken, without pay." Block
v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921).
'E.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
277 U.S. 183 (1928).
'E.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953)'See Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REV. 91 (X950).
a214 U.S. 91 (1909).
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of residential neighborhoods and securing adequate light and air for such sections.
And, of course, traffic congestion was not yet a problem.
Three years later, the Court demonstrated that it would not always defer to the
views of state courts on the reasonableness of urban land use controls. In Eubank
v. Richmond,' it held, reversing a judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia, that an ordinance authorizing the owners of two-thirds of the property
abutting any street to establish a building line not less than five feet nor more than
thirty feet from the street line was "an unreasonable exercise of the police power."
The Court had no objection to building lines. What it disapproved was the placing
of uncontrolled discretion in landowners to establish such lines. The Court reasoned
that since the ordinance was devoid of standards, there would be no necessary relation between building lines established and the "public safety, convenience, or welfare."
In 1915, the Court had before it in two cases municipal ordinances excluding
certain established businesses, livery stables in Reinman v. Little Rock" ° and brickmaking in Hadacheck v. Sebastian,": from designated portions of the city. Both
were upheld, despite allegations of substantial hardship, especially severe in the case
of the brickmaker, who claimed that, although the ordinance did not prohibit the
removal of his clay, the clay could be made into bricks economically only if the
brickmaking process occurred at the site of the deposits, and that the value of his
land was reduced from $Soooo to $6o,ooo. A factor which apparently influenced
the Court in these cases was that livery stables and brickmaking might in some situations be nuisances. Thus, the ordinances could be viewed as legislative efforts to
deal with potential nuisances. The contention that the ordinance excluding brickmaking denied equal protection of the laws because it did not also exclude other
commercial enterprises from the district and because brickmaking was permitted in
other parts of the city where similar conditions existed was answered by the statement that there was no proof that other "objectionable" businesses were actually present in the district from which brickmaking was excluded and that the city might in
the future deal with brickyards in other localities in the community.
The attention of the Court shifted in 1917 from livery stables and brickyards to
billboards, which were prohibited by a Chicago ordinance in residential neighborhoods unless the owners of a majority of the frontage of the property on both sides
of the street consented. In Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago,'2 the ordinance was held
not to violate the due process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Evidence introduced at the trial tending to show that offensive, unsanitary
and combustible materials usually accumulate around billboards and that billboards
afford convenient shields for immoral and criminal activities was regarded as sufficient to establish the propriety of putting billboards, as distinguished from buildings
and fences, in a class by themselves. In other words, although billboards may not be
0 2 2 6 U.S. 137 (1912).
10 237 U.S. 171 (I915).
21 239 U.S. 394 (1915).

12 242 U.S. 526 (917).
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nuisances, they are likely to breed nuisance-like conditions. There was still no suggestion that a city could, within the Constitution, specify the location of certain uses
of land for the sole reason that such locations were appropriate for such uses, in the
judgment of local officials. The Court did, however, express a policy of judicial
tolerance and left the door open for doctrinal development and expansion."' The
provision on the consent of property owners was held valid for the dubious reason
that it only allowed property owners to remove a restriction and thus was unlike
the consent clause held void in Eubank v.Richmond, supra, which authorized property owners to impose a restriction. The lack of substance in this distinction might
reasonably have led a contemporary observer to conclude that Eubank had been
tacitly overruled.
A much more significant contribution by the Court in X917 was its decision in
Buchanan v. Warley that a municipal ordinance creating separate residence districts for white and "colored" people was void because repugnant to the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 4 There was nothing in the opinion, however,
which would cast doubt upon the validity of zoning laws not involving racial segregation.
Two cases decided by the Court in 1919 added very little, if anything, to the
development of constitutional doctrine in this field. In St. Louis Poster Advertising
Co. v. St. Louis," an ordinance regulating the size, height, and location on the lot
of billboards was upheld. Mr. Justice Holmes thought that the question had already
been decided in Cusack. In Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hope,' petroleum storage tanks
were added to the class composed of livery stables, brickyards, and billboards. An
ordinance forbidding the storing of petroleum and related products within 300 feet
of any dwelling was held not to deprive one of due process of law who had an
established business the removal of which was required by the ordinance. Mr.
Justice Holmes said that even if it were true as alleged (which the Court doubted)
that the mode of construction of plaintiff's tanks made an explosion impossible, still
the fact that the "necessarily general form of the law embraced some innocent objects
. . .would not be enough to invalidate it or to remove such an object from
7
its grasp.'
The cases reviewed to this point all involved regulatory programs. In Green v.
8
Frazier,1
decided in 1920, the Court passed upon an affirmative program of development. North Dakota legislation authorizing a state agency to provide urban and
rural homes for residents of the state and to engage in certain other activities was
challenged on the grounds that the program constituted a taking of property without
due process of law and involved the use of tax revenues for private purposes. Upholding the statute, the Court conceded that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids state taxation for private purposes, but deferred to the determination by state authorities that the purpose in this case was public. This case and
"I1d. at 530.
U.S. 498 (1919).
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U.S. 6o (1917).
1d. at 500.
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the earlier case of Jones v. Portland," upholding a Maine statute authorizing
municipalities to engage in the enterprise of selling wood, coal, and fuel, seem to
have had the practical effect of eliminating any public purpose limitation in the
Fourteenth Amendment upon state taxation. Specific public purpose requirements
of state constitutions have been more troublesome.
A still different type of land control program was scrutinized by the Court in
I921 in Block v. Hirsh," holding that an act of Congress establishing rent control
for the District of Columbia following World War I did not deprive landlords of
property without due process of law or take their property without compensation.
Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Holmes referred to Welch v. Swasey and related cases and declared that "if to answer one need the legislature may limit height
to answer another it may limit rent."2 1 The four dissenting members of the
Court, fearful that approval of rent control during a period of war emergency would
lead to approval of an indeterminate program, insisted that there is a material distinction between rent control and use control, the latter being justified as prohibiting
the "use of property to the injury of others, a prohibition that is expressed in one
of the maxims of our jurisprudence. 22 Similar New York legislation was upheld in
Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman'3 and in Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel 4
One of the most significant contributions by the Court to community planning
was its approval in 1926 of a comprehensive zoning ordinance, providing for use,
height and area districts, in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Ca2 5 It did much to dispel
the hostility manifested by some state courts toward zoning and may have induced
state legislatures and local governments to enact zoning legislation. An adverse
decision would have been a most serious blow to planning effortso The law of
nuisances is to be regarded merely as a "helpful aid" rather than as limiting the
scope of the police power. Changing conditions require successive definitions of that
power. It now includes the "creation and maintenance of residential districts, from
which business and trade of every sort, including hotels and apartment houses, are
excluded," even though this means that the market value of some parcels of land is
drastically reduced, it having been alleged in this case that the market value of land
especially adapted for industrial development was reduced by residential zoning
from $io,ooo per acre to $2,500 per acre. However, the Court manifested reluctance
to abandon nuisance concepts completely, concluding that even apartment houses
may under some circumstances "come very near to being nuisances." And Mr.
Justice Sutherland's opinion has been criticized on the ground that it related the
provisions of the ordinance strictly "to the health and safety of the community" and
ignored considerations of "the stabilizing effect upon land values, of the beautification of a city through orderly development of improvements and of aesthetic satis"Id. at 156.
20 256 U.S. 135 (192).
10245 U.S. 217 (1917).
"Id. at 167.

2256 U.S.

270 (i921).

2'258 U.S. 242 (1922).

25 272 U.S. 365 (1926).

2' Planners had concluded that effective zoning could not be achieved through the power of eminent
BAssE-r, ZOMNG 27 (2d ed. 1940).
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faction in its bearing upon human well-being." 7 But another commentator has
marveled at the opinion's liberal and tolerant attitude, compared with the Court's
decisions of the period invalidating other types of economic and social legislation. 8
Although the zoning ordinance involved in Euclid provided for use, height and
area districts, the attack there was centered upon the use restrictions. Area regulation was considered in Gorieb v. Fox,2" where the Court upheld establishment of a
building line, requiring that a proposed building be set back almost thirty-five feet
from the street line. The same principles justifying use restrictions were deemed
to support regulations of area as well. The fact that building lines set back from
streets may have the effect of minimizing cost to the local government of future
street widening was not mentioned by the Court. This case is also important because it sanctioned the special permit device. The ordinance provided that the line
must be at least as far from the street as that occupied by 6o per cent of the existing
houses in the block, but by a proviso the city council reserved authority to make exceptions and permit the erection of buildings nearer the street. In this case the
council, acting under the proviso, established the line for one lot at thirty-four and
two-thirds feet in a block where the established line was slightly over forty-two
feet. This discretion of the city council was deemed distinguishable from giving
similar discretion to neighboring property owners, and also presumably different
from vesting it in an administrative agency. Though abuses of discretion by the city
council would not be countenanced, the existence of discretion to establish different
lines for individual lots is not unconstitutional.
The Court was careful to point out in its Euclid opinion that, due to the nature
of the allegations of the plaintiff landowner, the decision there amounted to little
more than approval of zoning in principle. Specific zoning ordinance provisions and
applications of zoning ordinances to particular parcels of land might still be held
unconstitutional. Later in the same term, in Zahn v. Board of Public Worls, 0 a
residential classification of a section of the city which was largely undeveloped, but
which contained scattered business uses and embraced land adjoining a major thoroughfare, was upheld on the theory that it was not clearly unreasonable. But in the
next term, the Court demonstrated that the caveat in the Euclid opinion was to be
taken seriously. Reversing a judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the Court held invalid in Nectow v. Cambridge"' the inclusion of certain land
within a residential district. The land in question was a portion of a larger tract
of vacant land separating residential uses from industrial uses. The evident purpose of the zoning authorities was to protect the established residential character
of the lands lying on the other side of intersecting streets bordering the vacant tract.
A master appointed by the trial court found that "no practical use can be made of
"'Miner, Some Constitutional Aspects of Housing Legislation, 39 ILL. L. REV. 305, 311 (x945).
8

2 Ribble, The Due Process Clause as a Limitation on Municipal Discretion in Zoning Legislation,
x6 VA. L. REv, 689, 699 (1930).
"9274 U.S. 603 (1927).
so274 U.S. 325 (1927).
'1277 U.S. 183 (1928).
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the land in question for residential purposes" and that "districting of the plaintiffs
land in a residence district would not promote the health, safety, convenience and
general welfare of that part of the defendant City." Despite these findings, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts did "not feel that the zoning line established
was whimsical, without foundation in reason."32 The reversal by the United States
Supreme Court was based primarily upon the finding of the master, "supported,
as we think it is, by other findings of fact," that the challenged classification would
not promote the traditional police-power objectives. The Court could see no reason
why the boundary between the residential and industrial districts should not be
moved ioo feet. The opinion fails to reveal the scope of the Court's study of the
effect of the judicially created boundary upon the neighborhood or upon the zoning
plan for the city.
One might have supposed that the meaning of Nectow was that the Court intended to supervise closely exercises of the recently approved zoning power. But
the immensity of such a task makes this supposition absurd. Indeed, the Court has
never again passed upon a zoning case. The Court's purpose, then, must have been
to guide the state courts. Yet, the standards set forth for their guidance are not
clearly discernible. Since the master found that no practical use could be made of
the land in question for residential purposes, it might be concluded that the Constitution requires that if land is zoned, the classification must permit a use for which
the land is adapted. The difficulty with this is that the Court did not appear to
attach any significance to that finding of the master. We are left with the generalization that the classification must promote the "health, safety, convenience and
general welfare of the inhabitants of the part of the city affected." Apart from its
vagueness, this standard, if a serious attempt were made to apply it, would imperil
most zoning boundaries. While it is easy to demonstrate the beneficent effects of a
comprehensive zoning ordinance upon a city, it is almost impossible to prove that
an isolated segment of a zoning line will promote traditional police power objectives. Surely the Court was not instructing the state courts that the proper procedure in zoning cases is to appoint a master and accept his conclusion as to con2 "If there is to be zoning at all, the dividing line must be drawn somewhere.

There cannot be
a twilight zone. If residence districts are to exist, they must be bounded. In the nature of things, the
location of the precise limits of the several districts demands the exercise of judgment and sagacity.
There can be no standard susceptible of mathematical exactness in its application. Opinions of the
wise and good well may differ as to the place to put the separation between different districts. Seemingly there would be great difficulty in pronouncing a scheme for zoning unreasonable and capricious
because it embraced land on both sides of the same street in one district instead of making the center
of the street the dividing line. . . . No physical features of the locus stamp it as land improper for
residence. Indeed, its accessibility to means of transportation, to centers of business, and to seats of
learning, as well as its proximity to land given over to residence purposes, give to it many of the attributes desirable for land to be used for residence. . . . Courts cannot set aside the decision of public
officers in such a matter unless compelled to the conclusion that it has no foundation in reason and is a
mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no substantial relation to the public health, the
public morals, the public safety, or the public welfare in its proper sense. These considerations cannot
be weighed with exactness. That they demand the placing of the boundary of a zone one hundred
feet one way or the other in land having similar material features would be hard to say as matter of
law."

Nectow v. Cambridge, 26o Mass. 44r, 447, 448, 157 N.E. 618, 62o (x927).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

formity of the questioned zoning with the police power. A charitable critic might
say that all the Court was trying to do in Nectow was to caution the state courts
to be vigilant in correcting abuses of the zoning power, and that the Court's language
was deliberately vague because the Court appreciated the difficulty of applying specific criteria uniformly in the solution of problems where local conditions assume
great importance.
The Court had declared in Euclid that its decision there did not preclude subsequent successful attack upon either applications of zoning ordinances to particular
lands or upon specific provisions of typical zoning ordinances. Nectow was an illustration of the former. The latter was illustrated by Washington ex rel. Seattle
Title Trust Co. v. Roberge,32 in which the Court revisited the problem of consent
clauses, this time holding invalid a provision that "A philanthropic home for children or for old people shall be permitted in first residence district when the written
consent shall have been obtained of the owners of two-thirds of the property within
four hundred feet of the proposed building." Cusack was distinguished on the
ground that the proposed building was not like billboards or other uses which "by
reason of their nature are liable to be offensive." It now seemed clear that the
distinction between consent clauses which impose restrictions and those which only
remove restrictions, if not repudiated, would rarely be applicable.
Excess condemnation received the Court's attention in i93o. Condemning land
for the immediate purpose of widening a street, the City of Cincinnati undertook to
acquire more land than would be occupied by the widened street. The constitutional question was whether the excess land was acquired for a public purpose if
the sole reason for its acquisition was recoupment of the expense of street widening
through the resale of neighboring lands, enhanced in value by the improvement. The
Court deemed it well established that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the power of eminent domain be exercised for a public
purpose, but declined to pass upon the issue in this case for the reason that the
state court judgment adverse to the city was supportable on the ground that the
condemnation proceedings failed to conform to applicable state law.8 4 There was
nothing in the opinion suggesting that the practice in question would be favored.
Thirteen years passed without an important decision by the United States Supreme Court in this field. Then came decisions upholding national rent control
It was also held that Congress has
programs during and after World War II'
power to provide low-cost public housing and may exempt from local taxation
projects owned by the Federal Public Housing Authority. 0 In Queenside Hills
Realty Co. v. Saxl,3 the Court shored up local efforts to deal with slum housing by
its holding that a New York law requiring installation of expensive fire prevention
s278 U.S.

It6 (1928).

' Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439 (193o).
Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U.S. X38 (948); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1943).
'6 Cleveland v. United States, 323 U.S. 329 (945).
37 38 U.S. 8o (1946).
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sprinder systems in lodging houses did not violate the due process or equal protection

clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, even as applied to buildings equipped with
other types of fire protection devices alleged to be adequate. The decision was hardly
unexpected. The "public use" limitation upon eminent domain again engaged the
Court in United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Welch,"' a case which did not directly involve community planning, but which had implications for it. Upholding condemnation by the T.V.A. of lands not strictly necessary for a proposed dam and reservoir,
the Court manifested extreme reluctance to upset condemnation proceedings for
want of a public use, and apparently all but three of the Justices were willing to
regard as final a determination by Congress that a use is public.
The recent historic decisions on racial restrictive covenants are well known.3 9
The most recent case is Berman v.Parker," decided during the 1954-55 term,

holding that condemnation of property pursuant to the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 was for a public purpose and was consistent with due
process of law, and that the delegation of authority in the act was qualified with
sufficient standards. There was unanimous concurrence in Mr. Justice Douglas'
opinion that the police power of Congress over the District of Columbia, deemed
as extensive as the police power of the states, comprehends a wide discretion in the
acquisition and redevelopment of large blocks of land. An attempt to hobble this
discretion by limiting it to elimination of slums, defined narrowly as the existence
of conditions injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare, was brushed

aside. The standards contained in the act in question were considered adequate to
sanction the redevelopment of not only slums, but also "the blighted areas that tend
to produce slums," including particular lots which are not blighted at all. The
police power, the Court indicates, is even broader, embracing redevelopment for
the general objective of achieving a "better balanced, more attractive community."
The Court does its best to make it clear that the "traditional applications" of the

police power--"public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and
order"--are merely illustrations of the police power, not limitations upon it. Aesthetic
and spiritual values may also be sought through exercises of this power. As for the
power of eminent domain, the "role of the judiciary in determining whether that

41
It
power is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one."
priby
done
be
might
redevelopment
for
land
of
was concluded that the acquisition
vate enterprise subject to public control, the use of private enterprise being regarded

merely as a means to an end within the power of Congress.
Berman v. Parker is of the utmost importance. Not only does it sanction a
58 327

U.S. 546 (946).

v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer,
24 (948).
40 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
Four years earlier, in a similar case, involving
of Pennsylvania, the Court had affirmed the judgment below (upholding
opinion, citing the Welch case, stepra note 38. Burt v. Pittsburgh, 340
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31, 32, 35 (1954).
"z
"Barrows

Hodge, 334 U.S.

334 U.S.

1

(1948); Hurd v.

the Urban Redevelopment Law
the law) with a memorandum
U.S. 892 (95o).
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planning device which is the most promising yet attempted at the local level, but
it also manifests a sympathetic and tolerant attitude toward community planning in
general. The broad reading of the opinion is that the Constitution will accommodate a wide range of community planning devices, as states and local governments
seek new ways to meet the pressing problems of community growth, deterioration,
and change.
This conclusion is also borne out by the record of the United States Supreme
Court in the line of cases reviewed here, commencing with Welch v. Swasey. The
only decisions adverse to planning programs were Eubank v. Richmond, Seattle Title
Trust Co. v. Roberge, and Nectow v. Cambridge. None of these could fairly be
considered major setbacks for community planning. Consent clauses in land use
regulations, invalidated in Eubank v. Roberge, are not essential and are probably
undesirable4 2 It was not a planning device, but only the zoning classification of a
particular tract of land, which was held void in Nectow. The Court handled the
problem there badly, but not even the most ardent planner would deny that abuses
in zoning can and do occur or assert that the courts should ignore such abuses.
Perhaps the most serious criticism which can be leveled at the performance of the
Court in this series of cases is that the overly cautious language in some of the
opinions may have deterred legislative advances and have induced restrictive action
by state courts.
A full appraisal of the role of the Court requires consideration not only of its
decisions, but also of the instances in which it has avoided decision by refusing to
review lower court judgments. During the past six terms of the Court (1949-1950
to 1954-1955, as of January i, 1955), the Court has declined to review, by dismissing
appeals or denying petitions for certiorari, twenty-one cases which might fairly be
regarded as local planning cases. In all of these except one, the judgments below
upheld statutes, ordinances or actions by local officials. The single exception was a
holding below that the granting of a variance by a zoning board of appeals was invalid 3 Thus, the record of the Court in abstaining from review of local planning
cases during this period has been decidedly favorable to planning programs.
' See Note, The State Courts and Delegation of Public Authority to Private Groups, 67 HARV. L.
Rv. 1398 (954).
' Board of Zoning Appeals of Hempstead v. Clark, 340 U.S. 933 ('95'). The other cases: McCarthy v. Manhattan Beach, 348 U.S. 817 (1954) (zoning); Jayne v. Detroit, 348 U.S. 802, 889 (x954)
(parking meters); Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 347 U.S. 934 (1954) (urban redevelopment); Gazan v. Corbett,
346 U.S. 822 (1953) (zoning); Carlor Co. v. Miami, 346 U.S. 821 (1953) (eminent domain); Elsato
Real Estate, Inc. v. Miami Beach, 346 U.S. 82o (1953) (zoning); Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne, 344
U.S. 919 (i953) (zoning); Veal v. Leimkuehler, 344 U.S. 913 (953) (zoning); White v. Chicago Land
Clearance Commission, 344 U.S. 824 (1952) (urban redevelopment); Mundet Cork Corp. v. New
Jersey, 344 U.S. 819 (952) (smoke control); Flora Realty & Investment Co. v. Ladue, 344 U.S. 802
(952)
(zoning); Cherrywood Apts., Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 902 (1952) (public housing);
Newark v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 342 U.S. 874 (1951) (eminent domain); Dallas County
Water Control and Improvement District No. 3 v. Dallas, 340 U.S. 952 (951) (municipal annexation);
Prunk v. Indianapolis Redevelopment Commission, 340 U.S. 950 (r951) (urban redevelopment);
Marsh v. El Dorado, 340 U.S. 940 (1951) (municipal annexation); Standard Oil Co. v. Tallahassee, 340
U.S. 892 (1950) (zoning); Corporation of Latter Day Saints v. Porterville, 338 U.S. 8o5 (1949) (zoning);
Glissmann v. Omaha, 339 U.S. 96o (1950) (zoning); Keyes v. Madsen, 339 U.S. 928 (195 o ) (compulsory building demolition).
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PATIERN OF STATE COURT DECISIONS

In contrast to the paucity of community planning cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court, the state courts have poured out a flood of decisions, many
of which involve issues of constitutional law, state and national. In general, plan-

ning, as well as other types of social and economic programs, have not fared as well
in the state courts as in the United States Supreme Court. At the hands of some

state courts, broad concepts of constitutional law-substantive due process, equal
protection of laws, separation of powers, nondelegation of legislative power, public
purpose in taxation and spending, public use in eminent domain-have become rigid
and narrow. Possibly most of the adverse decisions are properly viewed as irritants
rather than as crippling blows to planning. At least since Euclid, it appears that
there has been general judicial acceptance of the principle that local governments
may attempt to control the physical condition of their communities, that, within
limits, public decisions as to land use shall prevail over private decisions, and that
even substantial losses in some land values caused by community plans need not be
compensated. The unfavorable decisions have involved particular planning programs, usually those thought to impose excessive sacrifices, discrimination or unfair
procedures, and sometimes programs involving features regarded as novel or as

specifically forbidden by constitutional provisions. A few illustrative cases, selected
from the areas of planning administration, planning instrumentalities, and planning
decisions, will be considered briefly.
A. Planning Administration
Ideally, there should be insistence upon constitutional procedures which are
sufficiently stringent to promote fairness, but not so inflexible or impracticable as to
stifle effective action. One of the more frequently raised questions is whether there
is an improper delegation of power to an administrative agency.
This challenge, no longer a potent threat to acts of Congress, is still formidable
when state legislation and local ordinances are being tested.44 It can usually be
overcome, in advance, by a careful statement of standards, which may satisfy the
courts that administrative power is thereby restrained, but which in reality afford
hardly any protection against arbitrary action.45
The incidence of invalidations of statutes and ordinances on this ground may be
a commentary on the quality of legislative draftsmanship at state and local levels.
There are some instances of judicial punctiliousness, however, which it is doubtful
even the most meticulous draftsman would have anticipated. For example, an Illinois
ordinance was held invalid which directed the building inspector to refuse a building
permit for the erection of a building not having its principal frontage upon a "street
or officially approved place," on the ground that the ordinance contained no definition
of "officially approved place. 46 A Florida zoning ordinance was not saved from
"KENNETH

1

C. DAvis, ADMINMsnvE LAw c. 2 (1951).

ibid.

"Schimpff

v. Norvell, 368 IM. 325, 13 N.E.2d 96o (1938).
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attack recently by an elaborate specification of details. It provided that in a Business
"A" District, "no operation shall be carried on which is injurious to the operating
personnel of the business or to the other properties, or to the occupants thereof by
reason of the objectionable emission of cinders, dust, dirt, fumes, gas, odor, noise,
refuse matter, smoke, vapor, vibration, or similar substances or conditions." The
court, stressing the word "objectionable," construed the ordinance as being condi47
tioned upon the objections of neighbors, and thus equated it with consent clauses.
Since ordinances can easily be amended, the effect of such decisions may not be
extremely serious. But, of course, before the ordinance can be amended, a few
enterprisers may have escaped regulation and have established "vested" rights, and
it is conceivable that frequent invalidations of planning ordinances would have a
demoralizing effect upon planning efforts.
On occasion, the state courts have condemned as inadequate standards which
were about as specific as they could be, in light of the nature of the administrative
task. Perhaps the best known example is Welton v. Hamilton,4 holding invalid the
grant of power to a board of zoning appeals to vary the application of the ordinance
in instances where "there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship in the way
of carrying out the strict letter of the ordinance ...so that the spirit of the ordinance
shall be preserved. . . ." If the standard were much more specific than this, it is
doubtful that a board of zoning appeals could perform satisfactorily the function
expected of it, the essence of which is the handling of unforeseen problems. This
decision seemed especially serious since it invalidated the enabling statute as well as
the ordinance. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, Welton v. Hamilton has not actually
prevented the exercise of broad administrative power to grant zoning variances during the more than twenty years since it was handed down, according to a recent study
of the Illinois situation.49 An innocuous amendment of the enabling statute, substituting "particular hardship" for "unnecessary hardship" and requiring findings
of fact, apparently has sufficed ° Indeed, boards of zoning appeals in Illinois, as
well as elsewhere, have been criticized for over-leniency. '
B. Planning Instrumentalities
The banning of a useful planning tool is likely to be a more serious matter than
either the insistence upon excessive standards of administration or the invalidation
of particular planning decisions.
After the Euclid decision in 1926, the state courts which had not already done
so came around to the conclusion that zoning, at least in principle, was compatible
with their state constitutions, as well as with the United States Constitution. 2 The
""Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Anderson, 74 So.2d 544 (Fla. 1954). However, the action taken under
the ordinance in this case did appear to be arbitrary.
48 344 Ill.
82, 92, 176 N.E. 333, 337 (1931), discussed in Freund, Note, 26 ILL. L. Rav. 575 (1932).
'"See Dallstream and Hunt, Variations, Exceptions and Special Uses, 1954 U. or ILL. LAW FoRu(
213.

" Id. at 217.
"'Comment, 9 U. oF CHI. L. REV. 477, 493, 494 (1942).
i EMME-r C. YOcLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRAtCrIcE 25, 26 (2d ed. 1953). However, use zoning was
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not upheld in New Jersey until after the constitution was amended, and in a few other states constitutional amendment was deemed desirable. EDWARD M. BAssEar, ZONING 17-19 (2d ed. 1940).
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judicial testing of paricular zoning devices, however, seems to be a continuing task.
This is due, in part, to the emergence of new types of zoning controls from the
efforts of local governments to improve upon the early ordinances.
Classification schemes have been tested, and some have failed. Thus, for
example, it has been held that churches cannot be excluded from residence districts,53
or even subjected to general off-street parking requirements which would have the
effect of preventing use of a lot for church purposes."4 To so hold is to allow the
problems generated by churches in residential neighborhoods-traffic congestion, traffic
hazards, the cutting off of light and air, noise-to be overshadowed by an exaggerated concern for religious freedom. The exclusion of private schools from use districts in which public schools are permitted has been condemned. 5 Similarly, the
Supreme Court of Illinois recently held void an ordinance permitting grade schools
in an apartment district but excluding nursery schools. 56 On the other hand, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey refused to disturb an ordinance creating a residential
district which included high schools and grade schools, but from which colleges were
excluded.5 7 An off-street parking requirement for apartment houses was invalidated
because it was thought to be discriminatory in that the ordinance contained no similar requirement for other structures, such as rooming houses and hotels, creating
similar parking problems.58 An ordinance excluding residences from industrial areas
was held unreasonable and void, in so far as it was applicable to land suitable for
residential use and not adapted to industrial uses. 9 Some attempts to exclude certain uses entirely from a municipality have failed,6" while others have succeeded.6 1
Such efforts are manifestations of the broader problem of governmental boundaries
which do not correspond with appropriate planning boundaries. The worst aspect
of this situation is the risk that the interests of persons who have no voice in the
shaping of policy will be substantially affected. judicial vigilance is therefore justified. But until regional planning is accomplished, the striking down of programs of
the established governmental units may create planning vacuums.
In view of the trend in zoning ordinance revision in the direction of the creation
"Sherman v. Simms, 143 Tex. 115, 183 S.W.zd 415 (1944). For other cases in accord, see 2
YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTIcE, §222 (2d ed. 1953). Contra: Corporation of Latter Day Saints v.
Porterville, 90 Cal. App.2d 656, 203 P.2d 823 (1949), appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 8o5 (949).
"Board of Zoning Appeals v. Jehovah's Witnesses, 117 N.E.2d 115 (Ind. Sup. Ct. z954).
"State v. Northwestern Preparatory School, 228 Minn. 363, 37 N.W.2d 370 (1949). Contra: State
ex rel. Wisconsin Lutheran High School Conference v. Sinar, 65 N.W.2d 43 (Wis. 1954).
" City of Chicago v. Sachs, I Ill. 2d 342, 115 N.E.zd 762 (i953). Since this ordinance was of the
permissive type (i.e., the uses listed for each district are permitted, not prohibited, uses), it is possible
that the failure to mention nursery schools was inadvertent.
"Yanow v. Seven Oaks Park, ii N.J. 341, 94 A.2d 482 (i953).
"SRonda Realty Corp. v. Lawton, 414 Ill. 313, 111 N.E.2d 310 (1953).
" Corthouts v. Newington, I40 Conn. 284, 99 A.2d 112 (1953).
6 People ex rel. Trust Co. of Chicago v. Skokie, 408 Ill 397, 97 N.E.2d 310 (1951) (drive-in
theatres); Baris Lumber Co. v. Secaucus, 2o N.J. Super. 586, 9o A.2d 130 (1952) (storage and sale
of used building materials, lumber, mason materials, plumbing materials, and heating materials). Both
ordinances, however, appeared to have been aimed at the plans of particular enterprisers.
"Duffcon Concrete Products v. Cresskill, I N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (i949) (all heavy industry).
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of more and narrower districts,6 2 a recent New York decision that a parking district
(within which the only permitted uses were parking and storage of automobiles and
operation of service stations) was invalid as applied is significant."3 Although the
narrow holding there was only that the classification of particular property was void,
the decision seems to preclude the zoning of any property within a parking district
if the surrounding land has business buildings upon it and if the property in question would be suitable for similar more intensive business uses-the very situation
in which a parking district is needed. Some support for narrow districts is found
in a recent California decision upholding a beach recreational district, within which
the only permitted structures were lifeguard towers, wire fences, and small signs.4
Regulations which tend to encourage the establishment of exclusive residential
districts---"economic segregation"--constitute one of the most controversial aspects
of urban planning today. Criticism on this ground has been aimed at ordinances
establishing minimum building cost, minimum height, architectural conformity, minimum' cubic content of buildings, minimum floor area, and minimum lot area."3 Attention has been focused recently upon requirements of minimum floor space for
residences, which have been invalidated in Michigan and Pennsylvania, for lack of
sufficient relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare,60 but upheld
in New Jersey and Texas."" When it has been urged that minimum standards of
house size have a bearing upon health, especially mental health, by discouraging
overcrowding, it has been pointed out by critics that the size of a house has no relation to the number of people who live in it, and that if overcrowding is to be
prevented, control of occupancy is the solution. By way of rebuttal, advocates of this
form of regulation assert that occupancy controls are impracticable."' To this
writer, it seems that the police power ought to comprehend crude and unsuccessful
programs as well as perfect and successful ones. Moreover, if the people of a community decide through democratic processes that attractive and expensive residential
neighborhoods are to be promoted and preserved, it would be most improper for a
court to set aside that decision in the name of "democracy" or "liberalism." There
6

Babcock, Classification and Segregation Among Zoning Districts, 1954 U. OF ILL. LAw Foasmt 186,

187.
"8Vernon Park Realty v. Mount Vernon, 12x N.E.2d 517 (N.Y. 1954).
"McCarthy

v. Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal.2d 897, 264 P.2d 932 (953),

cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817

(1954).
"For

collection and discussion of cases, see Note, Zoning: Permissible Purposes, 5o COL. L. REv. 202,
204-207 (I95O). A three-acre minimum lot area requirement was upheld in Flora Realty & Investment
Co. v. Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 246 S.W.2d 771 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 802 (1952); and a fiveacre requirement was approved in Fischer v. Bedminster, ii N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952).
(which cites earlier Michigan cases
6 Hitchman v. Oakland, 329 Mich. 331, 45 N.W.2d 306 (i95I)
in accord); Appeal of Medinger, 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d xiS (1954).
7
' Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne, so N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S.
919 (1953); Thompson v. Carrollton, 2si S.W.2d 970 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948)
"The arguments on both sides are skillfully presented in Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards:
The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARV L. REv. 1051 (953);

Nolan and Horack, How Small a House?

-Zoning for Minimum Space Requirements, 67 HAmv. L. REv. 967 (1954); Haar, Wayne Township:
Zoning for Whom?-In Brief Reply, 67 HARv. L. REV. 986 (I954); Williams, Zoning and Housing
Policies, IO J. HousINo 94 (953).
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is no resemblance between the latest pronouncements of the United States Supreme
Court on the scope of the police power and the statement by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in its opinion invalidating a minimum floor area requirement that
"neither aesthetic reasons nor the conservation of property values or the stabilization
of economic values in a township are, singly or combined, sufficient to promote
the health or the morals or the safety or the general welfare of the township or its
inhabitants or property owners ... "-9
Retroactive zoning has incurred judicial disfavor. There are several instances of
invalidation of ordinance provisions requiring termination of non-conforming uses
which could not qualify as "nuisances." 7 Although prospective restrictions on use
may cause a greater financial loss to landowners than retroactive limitations, the latter
are apparently thought to be more severe. There are indications, however, that carefully drafted termination provisions allowing reasonable periods for "amortization"
will be upheld.
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Community development programs, as well as regulatory activities, have also
been subjected to constitutional attack. Since these programs are effected through
exercises of the powers of eminent domain, taxation, and spending, they have had to
satisfy the public purpose and public use requirements of state constitutions. Public
housing for low-income groups was approved everywhere except in Ohio, where it
was held that the properties of local housing authorities were not exempt from local
property taxation because such properties were not "used exclusively for any public
purpose."72 The recent cases support the acquisition and operation of public parking
lots, although a recent California case invalidated a municipal plan to turn over operation of such a facility to a private operator without reserving control over rates.73
A multitude of other municipal enterprises have also been upheld.7 4 The most important of the community development programs-urban redevelopment-involving
the public acquisition, assembly, and redevelopment of sections of the community,
has been upheld in nearly all states, Florida and Georgia being notable exceptions.75
The courts in the latter two states were of the view that the vice of the programs was
the ultimate sale or lease of the assembled land to private enterprisers. Their reasoning was surprising, to say the least. The Supreme Court of Florida asserted in apparent earnestness that if "the only purpose is to remove or abate a blighted area, the
" Appeal of Medinger, 377 Pa. 217, 226, 104 A.2d 1i8, 122 (1954).
"The leading case is Jones v. Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (930).

Recent cases: Akron

v. Chapman, 16o Ohio St. 382, ix6 N.E.2d 697 (1953); Corpus Christi v. Allen, 152 Tex. 137, 254
S.V.2d 759 (1953).
"' Standard Oil Co. v. Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950);
City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App.2d 538, 274 P.2d 34 (1954); see Note, 67 HAkv. I. Rv.
1283 (1954).
"' The cases are reviewed in Miner, supra note 27.

The Ohio cases are criticized in McDougal and

Mueller, Public Purpose in Public Housing: An Anachronism Reburied, 52 YALE L. J. 42 (1942).
" City and County of San Francisco v. Ross, 270 P.2d 488 (Calif. App. 1954), which cites other
cases on the subject at 491.
""See Comment, Public Land Ownership, 52 YALE L. J. 634, 641-644 (1943).
" The cases are collected in Papadinis v. Somerville, 12i

N.E.2d 714, 717 (Mass. 1954).
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police power is ample." 8 The Supreme Court of Georgia, when told that slums
contribute to juvenile delinquency, retorted: "We think juvenile delinquency
exists on both sides of the railroad tracks and, if this should be sufficient reason for
the use of the power of eminent domain, some of the most exclusive sections of our
cities could be razed to make room for industrial development." 77 In states where
redevelopment laws have been upheld, new questions can be expected to arise from
time to time as techniques are refined and improved. An advanced program in
Illinois, the Illinois Urban Community Conservation Act of 1953, authorizing the
redevelopment of "conservation areas" (i.e., deteriorating urban areas which are
likely to become slum and blighted areas), was recently upheld. 78
In connection with public land acquisition, it should be noted that there are some
decisions adverse to certain techniques for facilitating planning for future public
land uses. While it is established that a city may prohibit the erection of buildings
in mapped streets, and thereby minimize the cost of future condemnation, 0 the
application of this technique to parks and playgrounds was held in a recent case to
be a taking without just compensation. 0 Yet, if the city decides to condemn sites
for future public uses long in advance of the time of contemplated use, it may be
frustrated by constitutional or statutory requirements of "necessity," as in a recent
Michigan case holding that condemnation of a school site which might not be
used for thirty years was not necessary81
C. Planning Decisions
The term "planning decisions" is used here to refer to applications of planning
tools to particular situations, such as the inclusion of certain land within a certain
zoning district (the zoning map), the rejection of a proposed subdivision plat or the
redevelopment of a particular area. The invalidation of such decisions may leave the
planning instrumentalities intact. However, judicial review may be so severe that
the instrumentalities cease to be useful.
The need for vigilance by the judiciary is probably especially great here. The
influence of special interests is perhaps more likely to affect particular planning decisions than the formulation of broad policies or the adoption of planning instrumentalities. It may also be true that the former are not usually preceded by as
thorough study as the latter. Another factor bearing upon the determination of
proper judicial review is the nature of the governmental entity whose action is to be
reviewed. Nearly all planning decisions are made by governing bodies of local gov' Adams v. Housing Authority of Daytona Beach, 6o So.2d 663, 666 (Fla. 1952).
"'Housing Authority of Atlanta v. Johnson, 209 Ga. 560, 563, 74 S.E.2d 891, 894 (x953).
"People ex rel. Gutknecht v. Chicago, r2r N.E.2d 79X (IL. Sup. Ct. 1954); Zizook v. MarylandDrexel Neighborhood Redevelopment Corporation, 121 N.E.2d 804 (I11. Sup. Ct. 1954).
" Headley v. Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198 (936).
"°Miller v. Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. i89, 82 A.2d 34 (ig5i). The use of zoning for the same
purpose has also been disfavored, 2700 Irving Park Building Corp. v. Chicago, 395 I11 138, 69 N.E.2d
827 (r946).
" Board of Education v. Baczewski, 65 N.V.2d 8o (Mich. 9.54). But cf. Carlor Co., Inc. v.

Miami, 62 So.2d 897 (Fla. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 821 (953).
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ernments and citizen-staffed planning commissions, aided by expert staffs to an extent

which varies widely among localities. While the same bodies also formulate broad
policies and select planning tools, in doing so they are likely to rely upon the experiences of other localities and the research and recommendations of reputable private and public planning organizations. Some of the broad policy-making is done
by the state legislature, usually in the form of enabling acts. These acts, having a
broader political base and being more difficult to amend than local ordinances, are
entitled to greater judicial respect.
Most of the adverse zoning cases are invalidations only of the ordinance as applied. These cases are numerous. In some states, particularly Illinois, judicial antipathy has been so pronounced that it may have caused serious damage to the zoning
process0 2 Due to the infinite variety of fact situations presented in the cases and
the vagueness of the rationalization in court opinions, generalization about them is
difficult. However, it is apparent that many of the decisions are based upon extremely narrow conceptions of the zoning power. A fairly common characteristic
of the cases is the emphasis upon reduction in the value of the land in question
caused by the zoning mapP3 Yet, even substantial value declines for some tracts are
inevitable consequences of zoning, as was recognized and sanctioned by the United
States Supreme Court in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. Concern for this factor led
the highest court of New York to insist recently upon the unbelievably strict criterion that zoning is void "whenever the zoning ordinance precludes the use of
property for any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted. ' 184 If given general
application, this criterion would make zoning impossible. A dissenting opinion in
the New York case states more orthodox standards: a zoning ordinance is confiscatory only when it so restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose or when it restricts the property to a use for which it is not
adapted. Even these standards may be too strict. They impede long-range planning
when they are applied to land which is not presently, but may be in the future,
adapted for uses permitted by its zoning classification. An example is an earlier
New York case holding invalid residential classification of land in a largely undeveloped area on the ground that the property could not, then or in the immediate
future, be used profitably for residential purposes, 5
Perhaps some of the adverse decisions might have been avoided by more careful
zoning. A common cause of judicial dissatisfaction is the adjacent location of use
districts containing grossly incompatible uses, as where a zoning boundary separates
8"See Babcock, The Illinois Supreme Court and Zoning: A Study in Uncertainty, 15 U. oF Cm. L.
RIEv. 87 (1947).
"E.g., Reschke v. Winnetka, 363 III. 478, 2 N.E.2d 718 (936).
"Vernon Park Realty v. Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517, 519 (1954).
"Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938). Conceivably,
this case might have been decided differently had the city itself not been responsible in part for the
factors making this land unsuitable for residential purposes, by maintaining an incinerator and open
sewer in the vicinity.
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residential and industrial districts."s Utilization of narrower and more numerous
use districts, as well as mapping which provides gradual transition from highly
restricted districts to lightly restricted districts, may alleviate this problem.
Unique problems are raised by zoning map amendments, as distinguished from
the original mapping and re-mapping of large sections of the community. Typically,
amendments are sought by property owners who desire to devote their property
to a use not permitted in the use district within which the property has been placed,
but who are unable to obtain variances or special exceptions from the zoning board
of appeals. The courts are understandably chary of such changes, which may have
been motivated more by concern for individual property owners than for the welfare of the community.87 Some of the opinions come close to raising a presumption
against their validity.s' Undiscriminating application of such a presumption to all
amendments would be unwise. The earlier mapping, probably having been done on
a large scale, may not have taken into consideration adequately certain small areas.
Unanticipated developments may have occurred. Indeed, failure to amend an
originally valid mapping ordinance after a substantial change in conditions may result
in an adjudication that it is now invalid s9 Amendments initiated by planning commissions probably deserve greater deference than those proposed by interested landowners. Although the courts have not stressed the point, it would seem that they
should be unusually suspicious of amendments adopted by the local governing body
contrary to the recommendation by the planning commission9 In addition, the
scope and throughness of the study and deliberation preceding the amendment are
especially relevant factors for judicial review, although these also have been seldom
stressed in the opinions. A step in the right direction was taken in a recent opinion
basing the court's judgment invalidating an amendment, in part, upon the absence of
findings or reasons by the planning commission and upon the fact that the "atmosphere of the proceeding was not conducive to calm deliberation," it having been
shown that several "organized bus loads of angry property owners filled the hearing
80

Reschke v. Winnetka, 363 Ill. 478, 2 N.E.2d 78 (1936) was such a case.
"'Grant v. McCullough, 270 S.W.2d 317 (Tenn. 1954) is not atypical. There the court, invalidating an amendment changing the use classification of one lot, owned by an elderly widow with
a dependent invalid son, from residential to commercial, said: "No basis for this action can be conjured
other than that it emanated from a strong desire to help this good lady ....
It was inconsistent with
the general ordinance on the subject, and gave to Mrs. Grant a privilege withheld by the general
law from others in a situation like unto that of Mrs. Grant." Id. at 319.
"sPenning v. Owens, 65 N.W.2d 83r (Mich. 1954); Cresskill v. Dumont, x5 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d
441 (1954); Clifton Hills Realty Co. v. Cincinnati, 6o Ohio App. 443, 2r N.E.2d 993 (1938); Weaver
v. Ham, 149 Tex. 309, 232 S.W.2d 704 (1950). But compare Keller v. Council Bluffs, 66 N.W.2d N13
(Iowa 1954), which upheld an amendment changing classification of three lots from A Residence to
B Residence, thereby permitting a convalescent home, despite the facts that these lots were surrounded
by A Residence District land, that there had been no change in conditions in the area since the previous
zoning, and that the effect of the change was to sanction a previous non-conforming use which apparently had been illegal.
"Skalko v. Sunnyvale, 14 Cal.2d 213, 93 P.2d 93 (1939).
"Despite such circumstance, however, amendments were upheld in the following cases: Louisville
v. Puritan Apartment Hotel Co., 264 S.W.2d 888 (Ky. 1954); Goddard v. Stowers, 272 S.W.2d 400
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
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room, and frequently interrupted witnesses and counsel by booing and hissing, or
'
applauding."91
CONCLUSION

It is difficult to measure the impact of the adverse state court decisions upon local
planning. Although they are numerous and are accompanied by opinions severely
circumscribing the range of planning action, many of the unfavorable decisions strike
at aspects which could not fairly be deemed essential to effective planning. This is
especially true of invalidations of particular planning decisions, such as the placing of
certain land within a zoning district, which should be distinguished from invalidations of planning tools. The former, being peculiarly susceptible to improper pressures, should be subjected to close judicial scrutiny.
The role of the United States Supreme Court is much different from that of the
state courts. It can do no more than pass upon the broader issues. It does not
deserve strong criticism for its relatively passive role. When it has acted, it has
nearly always given its approval to the planning programs which have come before
it. In so far as state court decisions are based upon state constitutions, the United
States Supreme Court is powerless to reverse them, of course. However, the Court
may influence the attitudes of the state court judges, as it apparently did with its
opinion in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. Perhaps the Court could now make a
similar contribution by taking another case involving the zoning of particular land,
as in Nectow v. Cambridge. In view of zoning experience since that decision, the
Court might now be able to indicate more dearly the relevant criteria. It would
also be helpful if the Court would speak up on the status of certain planning tools
which some state courts have questioned, such as the termination of nonconforming
uses. This writer would not criticize the Court for its failure to review and reverse
state court decisions upholding planning devices regarded by some as accomplishing
"economic segregation." There is no less reason for the Court to defer to legislative
judgments on debatable issues of community planning than in the areas of business
and labor. It does not follow that because "economic segregation" may lead to
racial segregation, the former is entitled to the judicial antipathy accorded the latter.
No doubt many economic and social policies of government affect unevenly various
economic classes, and thus may bear more heavily upon some races than upon others,
but an attempt to trace such relationships and make them determinative of the
constitutionality of legislative programs would be to return to the approach of the
pre-1937 Court.
"1American University v. Prentiss, X13 F. Supp. 389, 392 (D.D.C. 1953), afld, 214 F.2d 282
(D.C.Cir. 1954). This case is one of the rare instances of amendment to place a tract in a more
restrictive classification, at the request of neighbors. For elaboration of the thesis that in passing upon
zoning the courts should place "greater emphasis upon the procedural aspects and upon the absence of
political or neighborhood pressures," see Babcock, supra note 82 at ioo-Io5.

